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Abstract 
 
This paper studies whether environmental management systems can spur eco-innovation, 
analyzing EMAS (Eco Management and Audit Scheme) adoption and patented innovations 
(at the European Patent Office) at firm level. It uses an original panel database of 30439 
European firms belonging to all sectors from 2003 to 2012. An original instrumental 
variable is implemented to control for potential endogeneity. The analysis reveals that 
EMAS adoption is conducive to more innovation at the firm level. The results vary across 
countries and sectors. In particular EMAS is positively related to green patents for 
medium and low tech manufacturing. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Environmental Management Systems (EMSs) are considered a promising type of 
environmental policy instrument finalized to increase the environmental awareness of 
firms and to reduce their environmental impact. EMSs are implemented voluntarily by 
private firms, however worldwide environmental authorities strongly encourage their 
adoption through subsidies and technical support. The European Commission provided 
since the 1993 the official European EMS, the Eco Management and Audit Scheme 
(EMAS), to certify firms adopting well defined eco-management practices. 
The number of EMAS registered sites has been constantly increasing over time (about 
38% over the last ten years in UE27), as well as the academic effort to explore potential 
impacts of its implementation at sectoral and at firm level, with particular attention to the 
impact on innovation (e.g. Wagner, 2007; Wagner, 2009; Gerstlberger et al., 2014; 
Rennings et al., 2006; Frondel et al., 2008; Horbach, 2008; Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009; 
Demirel and Kesidou, 2011)1. 
According to the existing literature, several advantages are associated with EMSs 
implementation: Molina‐Azorín et al. (2009) analyze the literature related to the EMS’ 
impact on firms’ financial performance, noticing that studies where a positive impact of 
environment on financial performance is obtained are predominant. Iraldo et al. (2009) 
show the positive impact of EMSs on environmental performance and on self-reported 
technical and organizational innovations. Lan et al. (2012) find a positive impact of EMS 
on human capital. Morrow and Rondinelli (2002) highlight the importance of the 
reputational effect of EMS implementation as well as the improvements in terms of energy 
efficiency; Dasgupta et al. (2000) provide empirical evidence that the EMS spurs 
regulatory compliance. 
Dangelico and Pontrandolfo (2015) find that firm's market performance is positively 
affected by the capabilities to implement environmental actions with a focus on energy and 
pollution and a firm's image performance is positively affected by the capabilities to 
implement environmental actions with a focus on materials.  
                                                                
1
 However, in some countries, the growing concern about the long-term profitability of EMSs on competitive 
markets, the perceived absence of economic returns associated to the costs of EMSs implementation (Morrow 
and Rondinelli, 2002; Hillary, 2004; Pederesen, 2007; Massoud et al., 2010), caused a slowdown in new 
registrations and in some cases provoked a drop of certified firms (see also Glachant et al., 2002). 
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 Technological innovation is a key factor for achieving a better environmental 
performance and for ensuring competitiveness of firms2, in this respect Colombelli et al 
(2015) show that eco-innovations make the effects of innovation on firms’ growth stronger, 
in particular for the so called gazelles. However, it is controversial whether the EMSs can 
spur innovation and, in particular, eco-innovation. The positive correlation between 
innovation and EMSs often found in the literature could emerge because more innovative 
firms are also more likely to be certified because there are (unobserved) factors spurring 
both innovation and EMS adoption. 
Existing literature often lacks of longitudinal dimension (e.g. Frondel et al., 2008; 
Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009) as well as cross country comparison (e.g. Horbach, 2008; 
Demirel and Kesidou, 2011) and mainly rely on self-assessed innovation and self-reported 
degree of EMS implementation. Furthermore, the empirical evidence is not conclusive: 
apparently, the EMS correlates differently with innovation according to specific types of 
innovation considered (Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009; Frondel et al., 2008) or according to 
the specific EMS considered. 
In order to overcome at least some of the limitations of previous studies, this paper 
relies on a database of 30439 European firms from 24 different countries, from 2003 to 
2012. We consider EMAS as a specific and highly requiring EMS for several reasons: 
firstly because it is the official European EMS, secondly, because it entails a number of 
core activities common to all firms and clearly defined, but proportioned to their size, and, 
finally, because strong empirical evidence on its impact on innovation at firm level over 
time is scarce. 
 This paper explores the environmental performance of the companies that can be 
captured by eco-innovations. We have therefore selected firms’ green patents using the 
WIPO Green Inventory. To overcome data limitations this paper uses also the count of all 
granted patents at the European Patent Office (EPO) to identify innovation at firm level 
(Wagner 2007). Patents are a very noisy indicator of innovative activity but however 
provide comparable measure of innovative outcomes (across time and countries). The 
results of our investigation reveal that EMAS is effective in fostering innovation at firm 
level. Also the positive correlation between EMAS and eco-innovation is confirmed. When 
considering green patents, EMAS shows a positive correlation for medium and low tech 
                                                                
2 See for instance Costantini and Mazzanti (2012) or Gauthier and Wooldridge (2012). 
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manufacturing. This evidence is consistent with the high concentration in our sample of 
innovative firms with EMAS certifications in medium and low tech manufacturing sectors 
and also with the literature on green systems of innovation. In fact  a substantial portion 
of eco-innovation is incremental and occurs in relatively more traditional sectors like 
chemicals, ceramic, paper, metallurgy and wood and, finally, environmental innovation is 
driven by regulation in particular more mature sectors (e.g. Weber and Hemmelskamp, 
2005; Cainelli et al. 2012; del Rio et al. 2015). The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 presents the relevant literature, and develops the relationship between EMAS 
and innovation. Section 3 describes the data and the methodology. We present our 
econometric results in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Environmental Management Systems and Innovation 
 
The EMS can be defined as “an organizational change within firms based on the 
adoption of management practices that integrate the environment into production 
decisions, identifying opportunities for pollution and waste reductions, and implementing 
plans to make continuous improvements in productions methods and environmental 
performance” (Khanna and Anton, 2006). EMAS3  similarly to all EMSs has a core of 
activities, entailing the publication of a periodical environmental report, the definition of 
management activities finalized to establish continuous environmental improvements, and 
the periodical assessment of outcomes, according to the scheme “Plan-Do-Check-Act”. 
EMAS has its own guidelines, and the third party audit allows firms to obtain the 
certification or its renewals over time. 
 
2.1 Background 
 
A number of empirical studies have attempted to identify the determinants of 
innovation at the firm level, and whether an EMS could be considered one of them (see 
                                                                
3 EMAS was drawn by the European Commission with Reg. CEE 1836/93, in the context of the Fifth EU 
Environment Action Programme 'Towards Sustainability'. EMAS was originally restricted to companies in 
industrial sectors but since 2001 it has been open to all economic sectors including public ad-ministrations. A 
second version of EMAS (EMAS II) was adopted by European Commission with Reg. 761/2001, and a further 
implementation was drawn with Reg. 196/2006. The ultimate revision (EMAS III) has been published in 2009 
(Reg. 1221/2009); it subsumes previous regulation, and entered into force on 11 January 2010. 
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Table 1). Several papers indeed introduce the EMS as a key explanatory variable of 
innovation. It is important to point out that most of these papers refers to eco-innovations, 
and firms’ environmental performance. Our paper focuses on both the overall innovation 
activity of the companies and eco-innovations. In addition the majority of these studies are 
based on self-assessed data on innovation and do not take into account the magnitude of 
introduced innovations, because they measure only the presence or not of any innovative 
behavior. 
Demirel and Kesidou (2011) introduce a measure of the innovative effort by using the 
amount of the environmental investments undertaken by British firms. They investigate 
the determinants of different types of eco-innovation, such as the end of pipeline pollution 
control technologies, the integrated cleaner production technologies and the environmental 
R&D. The paper introduces among the determinants of eco innovation the internal firm 
level motivations, namely the organizational capabilities of firms, in particular the 
presence of any EMS. The econometric results show that the EMS is effective in 
motivating firms to undertake investments in end of pipeline green technologies and in 
environmental R&D, but it is not effective in increasing R&D expenditure of firms that 
already perform green R&D. Finally, the variable EMS does not show any effect on the 
Integrated Cleaner Production technologies related investments. 
In some papers a very inclusive definition of organizational changes is considered (e.g. 
Horbach, 2008 and Frondel et al. 2008) and this introduces wide heterogeneity in the 
environmental effort declared by firms. Antonioli et al. (2013) study the relationship of 
complementarity between organizational changes and training4 on environmental 
innovations, finding no complementarity when the objective considered is the adoption of 
EMAS/ISO standards5. Rennings et al. (2006) narrow to the EMAS certified firms their 
analysis, trying to focus on a specific EMS and its characteristics as potential 
determinants of innovation. The study considers EMAS validated manufacturing German 
facilities to investigate the impacts of different characteristics of EMAS on technical 
environmental innovations and economic performance. The main results concern the 
importance attributed by firms to the learning processes entailed by the certification and 
the maturity of EMAS (measured as two revalidations obtained) in determining 
environmental process and products innovation. Similarly, Inoue et al. (2013) find a 
                                                                
4 High Performance Work Practices (HPWP) and Human Resource Management (HRM). 
5 On ISO and EMS see also Wagner (2003). 
6 
 
positive effect of the maturity of ISO14001 on innovative performance of 1499 Japanese 
firms in 2003. 
 
 2.2 Why EMAS should foster innovation? 
 
This paper asks whether EMAS affects the probability of European firms to innovate 
and measures innovation with patents. So far, the use of patent data to investigate the 
relationship between EMSs and innovation is still limited; to our knowledge only Wagner 
(2007) addresses the issue of the link between EMSs and environmental innovation 
performing a patent analysis. In addition, EMAS is a specific management process based 
on the improvement of the environmental performance at firm level, therefore we also 
deepen the study by considering the correlation between EMAS and eco-innovation 
narrowing the patent analysis to green patenting activity. The required compliance with 
the EMAS can be assimilated to the duty to comply with mandatory environmental 
regulation. 
The hypothesis that EMAS can promote, in general, product and process innovations 
and in particular eco-innovations and green products can be grounded on the capability 
perspective and the resource-based view of the firm. For example Wagner (2007) shows 
that EMS facilitate the development of strategic resources, which have a positive effect on 
innovation capabilities in general, and also on technological environmental innovations. 
Wernerfelt (1984; 1995) also suggests that EMS adoption fosters the development of 
strategic resources and competitive advantages, which have a positive influence on firms’ 
innovative capabilities.  
In this respect Dangelico et al. (2016) propose an interesting dynamic capability 
perspective and identify three processes that link EMSs and innovation: external resource 
integration, internal resource integration and resource building and reconfiguration. 
External resource integration “includes integration of knowledge on environmental impact 
of products during customers' use, integration of suppliers' knowledge and competencies on 
environmental impact of components, materials or production processes, and 
collaborations with channel members to reduce the environmental impact of products” (p. 
3). Internal resource integration includes collaborations between specialized functions of 
the firm (e.g. R&D, manufacturing, marketing and design) and the integration of 
sustainability knowledge and competencies in those functions. Finally resource building 
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and reconfiguration includes acquiring new resources (e.g. recruiting, training and R&D), 
and reconfiguring existing resources (e.g. new environmental divisions, new relationships 
along the supply chain). Also Marzucchi and Montresor (2017) study the different roles of 
internal and external knowledge sources on different eco-innovation modes. 
Learning and the development of knowledge is a key cumulative process that have a 
positive impact on future innovative performance (see Baumol, 2002)6. Indeed, EMS 
implementation can result in a new internal source of knowledge, and, at the same time, it 
can bring externally sourced knowledge, based on cooperation with other certified firms 
and partners. The complementarity between internal and external knowledge has been 
widely investigated as a determinant of innovation (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; 
Caloghirou et al., 2004; Arora and Gambardella, 1994). 
In addition we assume that processes that link EMSs and innovation may vary 
according to different sectors and different countries. Technologies may vary substantially 
in terms of access to external resources, of flexibility to integrate internal resources and, 
finally, possibility to build and reconfigure resources. Wagner (2009) discusses in depth 
how county-specific national cultures and regulatory regimes affect the relationship 
between EMS implementation and process innovations. 
The organizational structure of firms can make the introduction of eco-innovations more 
likely or more difficult, and the adoption of well-designed EMSs can improve innovative 
performance. A characteristic of EMSs is that they provide permanent incentives for 
further reductions of the environmental impact. Even though EMAS has been defined a 
“medium swords” program (Prakash and Potoski, 2005) because it does not sanction 
shirkers, it nonetheless entails periodical monitoring and annual public disclosure of the 
environmental performance of adherents. Certified firms have to monitor their activities 
and improve their performance under several indicators. The persistent gain in efficiency 
is a challenging achievement, and forces firms to take advantage from the best 
technologies available on the market, and eventually to develop innovation to provide the 
improvements stimulated by the EMAS.  
 
                                                                
6 Rennings et al. (2006) demonstrate the importance of learning processes by EMSs in developing 
environmental product innovations (the study though is limited to certified firms and does not provide a 
comparison with non-certified firms’ performance). 
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2.3 Implications 
 
The implications in terms of public policy are in line with the broad strand of literature 
- driven by the theoretical framework of the Porter hypothesis – that analyzes the 
relationship between stringent environmental regulation and innovation (Porter and van 
der Linde, 1995; Rennings and Rammer, 2011). Jaffe and Palmer (1997) find that 
increasing the environmental regulatory compliance expenditure influences positively 
general technical innovation. Similarly, Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003) find that 
environmental innovation responds to increases in pollution abatement expenditures.  
Rennings et al. (2006) argue that, even though market-based instruments are generally 
considered those with the highest innovation efficiency with respect to command and 
control regulation, standards can be more effective in stimulating environmental 
innovation in situations characterized by strategic behaviors of firms (i.e., when the 
impact of one’s own activities on other firms are taken into account). Although EMAS is a 
non-mandatory policy instrument, it is a standard; it entails environmental expenses and 
can be assimilated to stringent environmental regulations. 
Wagner (2009) find that environmental management systems are associated with 
process innovations, but that this is moderated by country-specific national cultures and 
regulatory regimes. Indeed, the interaction of EMSs with country location significantly 
affects environmental product innovations. 
Finally, Könnölä and Unruh (2007) question the enthusiastic private and public sector 
support for EMS implementation: EMS may initially produce improvements in 
environmental performance, but EMS may also constrain organizational focus to the 
exploitation of present production systems, rather than exploring for superior innovations 
that are discontinuous. According to the authors, EMSs can contribute to inertia in the 
actual production system rather than facilitate the shift toward always more sustainable 
technologies and systems. 
 
2.4 The reverse causality issue 
 
Some authors have argued that more innovative and technological active firms are more 
likely to be able to implement the changes associated with the adoption of EMSs. In fact 
relatively more innovative companies might decide to consolidate their overall position 
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using EMSs. So there is potential reverse causality between EMS and innovation. Frondel 
et al. (2008) addresses the issue of the relationship between EMSs and environmental 
innovation performance by modeling a recursive bivariate probit model that allows for 899 
German firms' decision on innovation activities and EMSs adoption to be simultaneous. 
The econometric estimation reports no significant effect of the EMS as a determinant of 
abatement technological innovations.  
Ziegler and Nogareda (2009) discuss why relatively more innovative firms are more 
likely to adopt EMSs and analyze whether the adoption of an EMS or other environmental 
assessment activities can be explained by the adoption of any technological environmental 
innovation implemented. The paper uses a sample of 368 German manufacturing firms 
and considers both formal and informal management systems. The results show a positive 
effect of environmental innovation on the adoption of EMSs, but according to the authors 
this conclusion can be challenged because omitted underlying firm heterogeneity could not 
be controlled in a cross-sectional framework, i.e. their estimation could be biased by the 
absence of control for characteristics that affect both the adoption of an EMS and the 
implementation of technological environmental innovations. 
It is difficult to address the issues of reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity 
with cross sectional databases that are however very common in this branch of literature.  
Longitudinal data could partially address the issue For example Horbach (2008) overtakes 
the difficulties related to the use of cross-sectional data, by relying on two different panel 
databases7. The econometric results of the first analysis confirm a positive role of the 
environmental management tools in determining the adoption of an environmental 
innovation in the two previous years. The environmental innovation is self-assessed by 
firms and it is limited to a binary variable that does not take into account the magnitude 
of the innovative performance. The paper reports a second analysis using the MIP panel 
wave 2001, collecting data for 4846 firms in the manufacturing and service sectors. The 
paper considers any change in the organizational structure (which includes the 
introduction of EMS, but in a generic sense, e.g. any management system, even informal) 
and shows a positive effect on innovation measures. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                                
7 The establishment panel of the Istitute for Employment Research (IAB) and the Mannheim innovation panel 
(MIP). 
10 
 
 
3. Database and methodology 
 
  3.1 Database 
 
The analysis is based on a unique database originating from different sources. We 
started from the Amadeus database with a random sample of 40000 European (EU27) 
firms. We then merged these 40000 firms with the ones contained in the EMAS Register8, 
updated to 2012, in order to identify the certified firms, merging at first tax code and 
company name information and then checking the complete correspondence with the full 
address. At the end of 2012 the EMAS Register contained 4502 firms with information on 
registered sites, number of employees, date of the first registration, NACE code and 
environmental verifiers responsible for the accreditation. From the EMAS Register we 
excluded public administrations. We also use data on Environmental Expenditure on GDP 
from Eurostat9. 
We merged financial data for the whole list of firms from 2003 to 2012 and patent 
portfolio from the Amadeus database. We have selected the granted patents at the 
European Patent Office by priority date10. In addition to the overall amount of patent we 
identify green patents using the PATSTAT database merging the applicant name with the 
name of the firms in the sample. Green patents are identified using the Wipo Green 
Inventory. The WIPO Green Inventory was created by the IPC Committee of Experts in 
order to enable searches for patent information relating to so-called Environmentally 
Sound Technologies as listed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). It includes all the IPC classes that are associated with environment-
friendly technologies in a variety of fields. In particular, it includes six technological fields: 
alternative energy production, transportation, energy conservation, waste management, 
                                                                
8The European EMAS Register, provided by the European Commission, is available on line and yearly updated 
(http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/register/). For EMAS diffusion in Italy see also Jirillo et al. (2003). 
9 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. 
10 It corresponds to the first filing worldwide and therefore it is the closest to the invention date. This paper 
uses granted patents. An alternative strategy could have been to use patent applications that are also a good 
indicator of companies’ innovative effort. The advantage in this case is that the number of patent applications 
is larger: typically at the EPO approx. 2/3 of the applied patents are granted. The advantage of using granted 
patents is that they have passed the severe examination procedure at the EPO and therefore there is the 
certainty of having valid patents. Also this paper does not control directly for the quality of patents (e.g. 
Squicciarini et al. 2013) since patent quality indicators are not available in the companies’ patent portfolio 
from the Amadeus database. 
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agriculture/forestry, administrative-regulatory as well as design aspects and nuclear 
power generation. The Green Inventory represents a valid and commonly used instrument 
to select green patents, however it also presents some limitations mainly due to the 
restricted number of classes included.  
We obtained a final panel spanning from 2003 to 2012, reporting observations on 30439 
European firms. The sample is composed by firms from eight different industries plus a 
residual category: 1. Infrastructure, 2. Trade 3. General Services, 4. Knowledge Intensive 
Business services (Kibs), 5. High Tech Manufacturing, 6. Medium Tech Manufacturing, 7. 
Low Tech Manufacturing, 8. Agriculture and 9. Others. Table 2 shows the sample 
composition by sector. Table 2 shows also the average number of employees by sector and 
the average turnover. Table 3 displays the number of firms and the number of firms with 
the EMAS certification by country. It can be underlined that EMAS certified firms in the 
sample are mainly in Spain (38.48%) Germany (25.34%) and Italy (12.91%). It can be 
added that SMEs among EMAS are prevalent (about 53% of small firms and about 30% 
medium size firms).  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Table 4 shows that innovative firms represent 10.36% of the sample (firms with at least 
one granted patent), among them, more than a half is concentrated in the Medium tech 
and Low tech manufacturing sector. Not surprisingly, the sector in which the percentage of 
innovators is the highest is the High tech manufacturing sector. Also the highest 
concentration of innovative firms with EMAS certifications is in medium and low tech 
manufacturing sectors. A very low percentage of firms have green patents, mainly high 
tech and low tech firms. This is not necessarily due to the fact that the companies in our 
sample do not apply for green patents rather the matching procedure based on company 
names between Amadeus and PATSTAT might lead to an underestimation of the number 
of patents that can actually be classified as green. 
EMAS certified firms seems to be more innovative with respect to non certified firms, as 
the percentage of EMAS with at least one patent in their portfolio is 23.7% against 9.6% of 
innovative firms in the non certified firms group. 
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[Table 4 about here] 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
In our sample, 1082 EMAS firms obtained EMAS certification before 2003, while 810 
became EMAS during the period 2003-2012. Table 5 summarizes the number of new 
registrations per year. The peak of new certifications is between 2006 and 2009.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
3.2 Variables and methodology 
 
The dependent variable PATENTSi,t is the number of granted patents in year t by firm 
i. Similarly, GREEN PATENTSi,t is the number of green patents. The models we estimate 
are: 
 
PATENTS i,t = f(i, t, EMAS i,t-1, Z i,t-1, Ɛi,t)                                                                  (1) 
 
GREEN PATENTS i,t = f(i, t, EMAS i,t-1, Z i,t-1, Ɛi,t)                                                   (2) 
 
EMASi,t-1 is the key explanatory variable and Zi,t-1 represents a vector of control 
variables. The independent variables have been chosen for the analysis on the base of prior 
empirical literature, provided their availability on our database (see for instance Wagner, 
2008; Demirel and Kesidou, 2011; Horbach et al., 2008; Frondel et al., 2008). The 
explanatory variable related to our research question is the dummy EMAS i,t-1: it is equal 
to zero for non certified firms, it is equal to 1 for certified firms, from the year of the 
accreditation; if the accreditation is obtained before the 2003 it is always equal to 1.  
Wagner (2007) argued that a certification dummy is a relatively weak measure for EMS 
implementation. In addition our data do not include a measure of the degree of 
implementation; however we assume that in the EMAS case there is a minimum level of 
implementation irrespective of size and sector of activity, guaranteed by local 
environmental authorities that support private environmental verifiers in conceding the 
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accreditation. This should ensure comparability of the effort of firms across countries and 
of the degree of implementation.  
The reverse causality issue is discussed in the previous section. This raises the issue of 
the endogeneity of EMAS i,t-1. Some characteristics of firms affecting EMAS i,t-1 as well as 
PATENTS i,t variables are likely to be correlated with unobserved factors relegated into 
the error term. To deal with these issues, we use panel data, we lag one year the 
explanatory variable EMAS i,t-1, we introduce fixed effects, we control for dynamic country 
and sector specific trends, and we, finally, use an instrumental variable11 (see below).  
We include several control variables (Zi,t-1) such as the number of employees 
(EMPLOYEESi,t-1) and past profits (expressed as share of turnover, PROFITi,t-1) to take in 
account size and past financial performance of firms. We also introduce the share of GDP 
devoted by countries each year to the environmental expenditure (ENV EXPi,t-1), as an 
attempt to control for country specific effects on innovation. This index should help 
controlling the trend in new certifications that could be generated by country specific 
environmental regulation. All these variables are lagged of one year. Other control 
variables included are YEAR dummies, to capture period trend effects, and the 
interactions between years and country dummies for the major countries in the sample. In 
addition a dynamic effect of country specific characteristics, such as regulation, domestic 
market characteristics, intellectual property rules and enforcement, and many others, 
cannot be excluded therefore we include COUNTRY*YEAR interaction term.  
Finally a limitation of the analysis is that we do not have information on R&D carried 
out by companies. However, on one hand, we know from the literature that for SMEs the 
R&D missing data should be more correctly read as zero R&D expenses, since R&D 
investments are strictly correlated with size (Brunneimer and Cohen, 2003; Shefer and 
Frenkel, 2005). On the other hand, we know that the propensity to innovate strongly 
depends on industries. In high tech sectors the possibilities of technological improvements 
are higher than in other industries, and this allows for a concentration of high skilled 
employees and a higher R&D expenditure. We therefore tackle the issue of missing R&D 
data controlling for the stock of patents at the firm level (PASTINNOi,t-1), calculated with 
                                                                
11 According to Rehfeld et al. (2007), using a lag of the explanatory variable seems of limited effectiveness; they 
find a high correlation of environmental innovations carried out in the past and planned for the future. Thus 
there should be high correlation between plans related to past and future environmental innovation and EMSs 
adoption. However, this is not automatically true for generic innovation that appears to be less correlated with 
environmental expenditure planned and linked to the implementation of EMSs. 
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the perpetual inventory method (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007)12. In addition we control 
the sectoral level heterogeneous dynamics introducing the SECTOR*YEAR interaction 
term. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
3.3 Instrumental Variable 
 
With the approach followed so far, the endogeneity issue has not been completely ruled 
out. We expect the variable EMASi,t-1 to be correlated with the error term of the main 
regression. To produce a consistent estimation of the EMASi,t-1 coefficient therefore we 
introduce an instrumental variable. A valid instrument lets us isolate a part of EMASi,t-1 
that is uncorrelated with the errors in our main regression, and that part can be used to 
estimate the effect of a change in EMAS on innovation. We use the variable VERIFIERS 
as instrument: it represents the number of private environmental verifiers per country 
over the period covered by the panel. This instrumental variable has never been used 
before to our knowledge and represents an innovative contribution of this study. 
The EMAS regulation establishes that in each country there must be private experts or 
companies charged with public environmental authorities to verify the existence of EMAS 
requisites to grant the certification. Since they are private consultants, they are interested 
in proposing their services to firms: they attend a specific training to become verifiers and, 
after that, they propose to firms their competences, by presenting the advantages to 
become EMAS certified. Therefore, they foster EMAS adoption and spread the information 
among local firms. Their presence in European countries has been overall increasing over 
time, even. At the end of 1998 environmental verifiers were 262; at the end of 2014 they 
reached the number of 411 operating in European Union. A larger number of 
environmental verifiers means a greater promotion on the territory of EMAS, a greater 
availability of opportunities to start the procedure of accreditation and, eventually, a 
larger number of firms that decide to adopt the certification. 
The variable VERIFIERS is correlated with the decision of firms to implement EMAS, 
however it is not correlated with the decision to develop or not patentable innovation. It 
                                                                
12 PASTINNO i,t-1 is estimated using the perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate δ=0.10. 
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can be noticed that the number of verifiers and its trend it's exogenous to country specific 
innovation policies, since it is not determined by any public incentives or subsidy and it is 
totally dependent on the voluntary choice of private experts that obtain a specific 
environmental qualification and try to exploit it on the market. The model estimates the 
parameters of a IV Poisson regression model in which some of the regressors are 
endogenous and it is suitable to model a non-negative count outcome13.  
 
4. Results  
 
Table 6 displays the regression statistics. Table 7 presents the fixed effects Negative 
Binomial14 performed on the whole sample as well as the Poisson model with fixed effects. 
The most important finding is that the variable EMASi,t-1 shows a positive and significant 
coefficient. This evidence suggests that the EMAS certification is effective in spurring 
innovation at firm level15. The result holds when controlling for COUNTRY*YEAR and 
SECTOR*YEAR interaction terms. For these models we calculate the Incidence Rate 
Ratios. A variation of one unit in the EMASi,t-1 variable, i.e. from 0 to 1 in the case of 
EMAS, is associated with a patent count increase of 1.299 in the dependent variable for 
the first regression, an increase of 1.2101 in the count dependent variable in the second 
estimation and an increase of 1.276 in the third estimation. The control variables have the 
expected sign: the stock of accumulated knowledge, as well as firms' size, positively 
influences innovation, while it seems that previous period financial performance does not 
exert any significant impact. At the same time, we do not find the same significant result 
when we consider the impact of EMAS on GREENPATENTS, whereas coefficients of the 
other control variables are consistent with previous estimations (Table 8). Overall, the 
estimated coefficients of EMAS on GREENPATENTS are positive and with the same 
                                                                
13 The decision to undertake an environmental certification is a deliberate choice of firms and does not have 
the characteristics of a randomly assigned variable. It could be that highly productive firms can have enough 
resources to result into both patents and environmental certifications or relatively more innovative companies 
might decide to consolidate their overall position using Environmental Management Systems. IF EMAS is non 
random, there is probably self-selection into EMAS. We have run also a Heckman selection model, to check 
whether our results are robust to potential selection bias. Some selction bias has been found and the results 
are in line with the ones presented below, they are not reported but are available from authors upon request. 
14 The Negative Binomial model seems to fit better if compared with the Poisson model, for some reasons. The 
sample mean is 0.21 whereas the sample variance is 4.32, so there is overdispersion. The test for 
overdispersion confirms it (coeff. 7.66*** SEs 1.77).  
15 As a further attempt to test the effect of the adoption of EMAS we introduce several lags in the Negative 
Binomial model. Here we report the coefficients (st. err. in parenthesis): EMASi,t-2: 0,091* (0,021); EMASi,t-3 : 
0,607* (0 .286) and EMASi,t-4 : -0.350 (0.244). 
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magnitude as the previous estimations even if they cannot be considered statistically 
different from zero. Our results therefore in this case are affected by the small number of 
green patents and the small number of green innovators detected in the sample. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
 
We replicate the model for countries subsamples and for sector subsamples, in order to 
analyze possible heterogeneities. Models from 1 to 4 in Table 9 illustrate the results for 
Italy, France, Germany and Spain. Models 5 and 6 illustrate the results relatively to 
France and Germany for green patenting activity; other countries such as Italy and Spain 
show once again a too small number of green innovators to produce some significative 
results. The positive and significant impact of EMASi,t-1 on innovation is mainly driven by 
Italy and Germany, while the impact in Spanish and French firms cannot be considered 
significantly different from zero. These results are worth of further consideration; in 
particular, the analysis related to such countries can be deepened with the introduction of 
the national regulatory framework in the model, to better understand the factors that 
differentiate German and Italian firms with respect to the other European firms. 
Table 10 and 11 (models from 7 to 11 and from 12 to 16) show the results for the 
following sectors: High tech manufacturing, Medium tech manufacturing, Low tech 
manufacturing, Kibs and Other services. EMASi,t-1 is positive and significant for sectors 
characterized by low knowledge intensity, while it does not have any impact on firms 
belonging to high (and medium) technological sectors.  
 
A possible explanation for this can be that EMAS exerts a different impact across 
sectors and that does not spur innovation "per se", but it is effective in fostering innovation 
mainly for those sectors in which the R&D expenditure is originally low and not very 
frequent, while the impact is not significant whenever the sector is characterized by strong 
R&D activities. Firms with low level of internal R&D could take advantage from EMAS by 
adding competences and routines to their existent knowledge, as a source of external 
knowledge with potential complementarity or substitution effects with other sources of 
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knowledge creation. The results are corroborated in Table 11, regarding GREEN 
PATENTS. 
 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
 
We address the issue of endogeneity of EMAS estimating the relationship between 
EMAS and innovation with an original instrumental variable (Table 11). We follow 
Wooldridge (2010, Ch. 18.5) and estimate the parameters of the regression with the control 
function estimator method16. The estimation confirms the findings of the main model: 
EMAS i,t-1 is significant and positive. In this case the Incidence Rate Ratio for EMAS i,t-1 is 
1.82. The result is robust to the introduction of the COUNTRY*YEAR and 
SECTOR*YEAR interaction terms, even if the magnitude of the coefficient progressively 
reduces. Similarly, EMAS positively affects green patents, but the magnitude of the 
coefficient is not remarkable. 
The model is just-identified, and this does not allow to test over identifying restrictions, 
however we test the weakness of the instrument that rejects H0 of weak instrument 
(Wald: chi2(1)   =    62.71 , p-value=  0.0000).  
 
 [Table 12 about here] 
 
 
                                                                
16 It uses the generalized method of moments (GMM) implemented in the ivpoisson command in STATA. The 
procedure estimates also the ancillary parameter called ρ: the coefficient on the residual variable included to 
control for the endogeneity of EMASi,t-1; in our estimation ρ =19.45*** (robust s.e. 1.32) providing evidence in 
favor of the endogeneity of EMASi,t-1. 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This paper analyzes the impact of EMAS on patented innovation in European firms. 
The analysis uses longitudinal data on 30439 European firms over ten years (2003 - 
2012).We find evidence that EMAS is positively associated with the number of granted 
patents; this result is particularly strong in Italy and Germany and in low tech 
manufacturing sectors and services. We also explore the environmental performance of the 
companies that can be captured by eco-innovations. We have therefore selected firms’ 
green patents using the WIPO Green Inventory. In this case EMAS certification tends to 
show a positive correlation with green patents. When considering green patents, EMAS 
shows a positive correlation for medium and low tech manufacturing. 
This study has important implications for business strategy and policy makers. Firms 
are increasingly required to develop a green innovation strategy. Some authors (e.g. Nash 
and Ehrenfeld, 2001) have suggested that companies could develop EMSs to hide poor 
performance and avoid regulatory scrutiny, but will not make the effort required to be 
innovative. This paper however shows that the adoption of EMSs can improve the overall 
innovation activity of the firms. According to our conceptual framework, strategy 
managers adopting EMS should then pay particular attention to three processes: external 
resource integration, internal resource integration and resource building and 
reconfiguration. This means for example improving learning processes about materials, 
products and components and integrating suppliers' knowledge and competencies. 
Internally managers should foster collaborations between specialized functions of the firm. 
Finally the adoption of EMSs can be exploited to recruiting, training and reconfiguring 
existing resources (e.g. new relationships along the supply chain) in order to improve the 
efficiency and creativity of the organizational structure (see also Marzucchi and 
Montresor, 2017). 
For policy makers this paper suggests that companies, exploring the use of technology 
in EMSs, select innovations that are patented and could be successful in a competitive 
environment. This is in contrast with the idea that firms spend their environmental 
investments in fighting regulation and stalling legislation, rather than in finding real and 
innovative solutions. This paper shows that EMAS is an effective instrument to raise 
innovativeness of certified firms while improving their environmental performance. We 
believe that this positive effect of EMAS justifies environmental authorities’ financial and 
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technical support to spur EMAS adoption, as well as certified firms’ effort. However, this 
paper finds that the relation between EMAS and innovation vary according to different 
sectors and different countries. The results seem to be stronger in those fields (low tech 
and services) where access to external resources could be easier and there is more 
flexibility to integrate internal resources and to build and reconfigure resources. EMAS is 
more convenient for low technological sectors and in some countries, providing support for 
the hypothesis that some regulatory frameworks are more EMAS and innovation friendly 
than others, and that some sectors are more suitable to exploit all the advantages of 
EMAS (Wagner, 2009). This result is valid also for green innovations. 
In this period of scarcity of resources to devote to the environment, policymakers should 
consider to exploit EMAS potentialities adopting strategic improvements of regulation. On 
the one hand concentrating benefits and subsidies for those sectors in which EMAS is 
more effective would maximize the returns from firms and environmental authorities’ 
efforts. Additionally, innovation friendly regulations should be enriched with specific 
provisions for EMSs, as they can be considered innovation friendly as well. 
Our results can be improved in many directions. For example the number of granted 
patents does not capture the all the possible innovations developed by firms and probably 
underestimate the innovative activity of the certified firms. In addition the dummy 
EMASi,t-1 does not provide a measure of the degree of EMAS implementation, thus 
allowing for some measurement errors. Finally, the explanation that justifies the absence 
of strong correlation between EMAS and green innovation is still scanty, and a more 
adequate measure of green innovation is needed.  
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Table 1. Literature review 
Author
s 
Years EMS 
Source 
of data 
Period 
of 
covera
ge 
Countr
y 
Data and 
sectors 
Main findings 
Demirel 
and 
Kesidou 
2011 
ISO1400
1 
DEFRA 
survey 
2005-
2006 
UK 
289 
manufacturing 
firms 
Not conclusive evidence: 
significant impact of 
EMS only on specific 
types of innovation 
Ziegler 
and 
Nogare
da 
2009 
ISO1400
1, EMAS 
telephon
e survey 
2003 
German
y 
368 
manufacturing 
firms 
Positive effect of 
environmental 
innovation on EMS 
adoption 
 
Horbac
h 
2008 
organiza
tional 
changes 
IAB, 
MIP 
survey 
2001, 
2004 
German
y 
753 firms in 
environmental 
sectors and 4846 
manufacturing 
and services 
firms 
Positive effect of 
organizational changes 
innovation 
Frondel, 
Horbac
h and 
Renning 
2008 
generic 
EMS 
OECD 
survey 
2003 
German
y 
899 firms, all 
sectors 
No significant effect of 
ems on abatement 
technology innovations 
Renning
, 
Ziegler, 
Ankele, 
Hoffma
n 
2006 EMAS 
telephon
e survey 
2002 
German
y 
1227 EMAS 
certified firms 
Positive effect of EMAS 
maturity on 
environmental 
innovation 
 
Wagner 2008 
EMS 
and 
Ecolabel 
postal 
survey 
2001 
9 EU 
countrie
s 
2095 
manufacturing 
firms 
Positive effect of 
ecolabelling on product 
innovation,not clear 
effect of EMS interacted 
with national regulation 
indexes on innovation 
 
Wagner 2009 EMSs 
postal 
survey 
2001 
9 EU 
countrie
s 
2095 
manufacturing 
firms 
Positive effect of EMSs 
moderated by local 
regulations and culture 
Inoue, 
Arimur
a, 
Nakano 
2013 
ISO1400
1 
OECD 
survey 
2003 Japan 
1499 firms 
of all sectors 
Positive effect of ISO 
14001 maturity on 
environmental R&D 
expenditure 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
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Table 2. Sample composition by sector 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
 
Sector Description N firms % 
Employees  
(mean) 
S.D. 
Turnover 
(mean) 
S.D. 
Infrastructure 
Electricity, gas supply, 
 water supply and waste 
management, construction, 
transportation and storage, 
real estate activities 
6223 20,4% 62 145.42 154.11 123.06 
Trade Wholesale and retail trade 7713 25,3% 49 109.39 128.63 204.47 
Kibs Telecommunications, R&D 2423 8% 61 136.34 152.67 188.06 
Other services 
Accomodation and food 
services, financial and 
insurance activities, 
administrative and support 
services, PA and defence, 
education, human health, 
arts and entertainement 
7240 23.7% 173 182.77 177.88 195.68 
High tech 
manufacturing 
Aerospace , 
Pharmaceuticals Computers, 
office machinery , 
Electronics-communications 
Scientific instruments 
402 1.3% 185 193.80 154.21 164.62 
Medium tech 
manufacturing 
Electrical machinery, 
Motor vehicles 
Chemicals, excluding 
pharmaceuticals, Other 
transport equipment ,Non-
electrical machinery, 
Coke, refined petroleum 
products and nuclear fuel, 
Rubber and plastic products, 
Non metallic mineral 
products, 
Shipbuilding , 
Basic metals, 
fabricated metal products 
2571 8.6% 213 188.22 124.25 177.12 
Low tech 
manufacturing 
Other manufacturing and 
recycling, 
Wood, pulp, paper products, 
printing and publishing , 
Food, beverages and 
tobacco, 
Textile and clothing. 
3208 10.6% 158 153.56 166.67 193.92 
Agriculture 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
Mining and quarring 
410 1.3% 50 88.98 77.89 206.60 
Others 
Households and 
extraterritorial organizations, 
residuals (nace unknown) 
249 0.8% 65 106.29 172.07 201.81 
Total  30439 100% 99 150.43 169.24 196.48 
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Table 3. Sample composition by country 
Country N firms % N EMAS % 
AT 916 3.0 43 4.6 
BE 592 1.9 16 2.7 
CY 23 0.0 23 100 
CZ 21 0.0 21 100 
DE 8905 29.2 396 4.4 
DK 652 2.1 31 4.7 
ES 5271 17.4 651 12.3 
FR 6038 19.8 66 1.0 
GB 1351 4.4 43 3.1 
GR 15 0.0 12 0.8 
IE 995 3.3 44 4.4 
IT 2497 8.2 229 9.1 
NL 305 1.0 10 3.2 
NO 385 1.3 18 4.6 
PL 21 0.0 21 100 
PT 2426 7.9 49 2.0 
Other countries 26 0.0 24 92 
Total 30439 
 
1697 
 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
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Table 4. Innovative firms across sectors 
Sector 
N. of  
innovators 
(a) 
% of 
innovators 
on total 
sample 
N. of 
innovators 
and EMAS 
(b) 
(b)/(a) 
N. of  green 
innovators 
% of green 
innovators 
on total 
sample 
Infrastructure 247 3.9 51 20.6 10 0,00 
Trade 364 4.7 32 8.8 33 0,001 
Kibs 220 9.0 4 1.8 47 0,001 
Other services 283 3.9 8 2.8 16 0,00 
High tech 
manufacturing 
226 56 26 0.8 53 0,002 
Medium tech 
manufacturing 
1168 45.4 148 12.6 41 0,001 
Low tech 
manufacturing 
619 19 111 18 77 0,002 
Agriculture 19 4.6 2 10.5 0 0 
Others 10 4.0 1 10 1 0,00 
Total 3156 10.36 403 12.7 278 0,009 
                Source: authors’ elaboration 
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Table 5. Registration over time of new EMAS firms 
 
Registration Year N EMAS % 
2003 40 4.94 
2004 90 1.11 
2005 50 6.17 
2006 150 18.52 
2007 110 13.58 
2008 140 17.28 
2009 70 8.64 
2010 60 7.41 
2011 60 7.41 
2012 40 4.94 
Total 810 100 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
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Table 6. Summary statistics 
Variables and description  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable      
PATENTS i,t 
Number of 
granted patents 
per year 
0.208 2.098 0 100 
GREEN PATENTS i,t 
Number of green 
granted patents per 
year 
0.009 1.940 0 67 
      
Explanatory variable      
EMASi,t-1 
Equal to 1 if firm 
is certified and 0 
otherwise 
0.035 0.185 0 1 
Control variables      
EMPLOYEESi,t-1 
Number of 
employees 
76.774 159.777 1 4609 
PROFITi,t-1 
Share of profit on 
past revenues 
3.97 14.768 -100 100 
PAST INNO  
Patent stock 
calculated with 
perpetual 
inventory method 
0.066 0.632 0 67.98 
ENV EXP t-1 
Share of GDP 
devoted to 
environmental 
expenditure 
0.323 0.135 0.11 1.31 
Instrumental Variable      
VERIFIERS 
Number of 
environmental 
verifiers in the 
country each year 
67.32716             96.04062           0 239 
Sectors (dummies)      
Agriculture  0.013 0.114 0 1 
Infrastructure  0.22 0.414 0 1 
Trade  0.242 0.429 0 1 
Kibs  0.075 0.263 0 1 
Other services  0.231 0.421 0 1 
High tech manufacturing  0.012 0.111 0 1 
Medium tech manufacturing  0.077 0.267 0 1 
Low tech manufacturing  0.098 0.298 0 1 
Others  0.031 0.173 0 1 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
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Table 7. Fixed effects negative binomial and Poisson with fixed effects 
 Negative Binomial Poisson Neg bin Neg bin 
Dep. Variable: PATENTS     
EMASi,t-1 0.233* 0.278* 0.186* 0.190* 
 (0.093) (0.111) (0.098) (0.097) 
PASTINNOi,t-1 0.0387*** 0.037*** 0.0381*** 0.0359*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
EMPLOYEESi,t-1 0.0479*** 0.0481*** 0.0381*** 0.0412*** 
 (0.0103) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0108) 
PROFITi,t-1 0.0108 0.006 0.0212 0.0209 
 (0.0197) (0.001) (0.0209) (0.0203) 
ENV EXP t-1 -0.541+ 0.009   
 (0.308) (0.004)   
Years dummies Y Y   
Country*Year   Y  
Sector*Year    Y 
Constant -0.0832  0.306*** -0.6111 
 (0.161)  (0.0624) 0.5409 
Observations  183847 183847 183847 183847 
Wald chi2 1353.95 1323.16 1345.55 1284.37 
Log likelihood -8137.9498 -8006.1166   -8088.8942 -7887.1883 
Alpha :  20.05994   Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0:  chibar2 = 9.3e+04 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000 
Incidence Rate Ratios for EMAS:                                          1.26                                  1.32                            1.20                              1.21  
 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
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Table 8. Fixed effects negative binomial and Poisson with fixed effects 
 Negative Binomial Poisson Neg bin Neg bin 
Dep. Variable: GREEN 
PATENTS 
 
 
  
EMASi,t-1 0.244 0.253 0.279 0.302 
 (0.251) (0.353) (0.247) (0.252) 
PASTINNOi,t-1 0.001*** 0.014*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EMPLOYEESi,t-1 0.006*** 0.002** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PROFITi,t-1 -0.005 -0.002* 0.002 -0.001*** 
 (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
ENV EXP t-1 -0.217 0.187***   
 (0.331) (0.002)   
Years dummies Y Y   
Country*Year   Y  
Sector*Year    Y 
Constant -0.038  -0.240 -0.701*** 
 (0.165)  (0.144) (0.160) 
Observations  183847 183847 183847 183847 
Wald chi2 1295.20 1469.47 1345.55 1284.37 
Log likelihood  -20122.277 -38688.84 -8088.8942 -7887.1883 
  
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
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Table 9. Negative Binomial FE Country subsamples 
 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IT FR DE ES FR DE 
 Dep variable: PATENTS 
Dep variable: GREEN 
PATENTS 
       
EMASi,t-1 0.243* 0.0900 0.707*** 0.0765 -0.141 0.247 
 (0.463) (0.669) (0.188) (0.209) (0.761) (0.252) 
PASTINNOi,t-1 
0.0490*** 0.0296* 0.0386*** 0.0271*** 0.007* 0.001*** 
 (0.00890) (0.0122) (0.00164) (0.00664) (0.001) (0.000) 
EMPLOYEESi,t-1 
0.0551 0.136 0.0324** 0.0590 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.0476) (0.115) (0.0115) (0.0365) (0.000) (0.000) 
PROFITi,t-1 
0.0117 0.0109 -0.000117 0.00842 0.007 -0.009*** 
 (0.00722) (0.0113) (0.00235) (0.00721) (0.007) (0.000) 
ENV EXP t-1 
-0.8316 5.466 2.123*** 2.631 0.004* 0.392*** 
 (0.9282) (4.295) (1.961) (2.516) (0.001) (0.021) 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 
5.805 -7.012 -10.69*** -6.892 -0.182*** -0.205*** 
 (7.266) (5.023) (1.013) (6.447) (0.035) (0.018) 
       
Observations 24970 60380 89050 52710 60380 89050 
Wald chi2 60,46 30,82 1211,64 38,94 30,82 32.89 
Log likelihood -496.25846 -233.71496   -6691.572    -650.07903 -233.71496   -832.92911 
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Table 10. Fixed Effects Negative Binomial, Sectors subsamples 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 high tech medium tech low tech kibs other serv 
      
PATENTS t      
EMASi,t-1 0.0164 0.0259 1.172*** -1.005 2.187 ** 
 (0.308) (0.155) (0.301) (0.672) (0.7192) 
PASTINNOi,t-1 0.0487*** 0.0414*** 0.0430*** 0.0350*** 0.0319*** 
 (0.00568) (0.00235) (0.00412) (0.00572) (0.00375) 
EMPLOYEESi,t-1 0.00539 0.00108 0.109*** -0.0108 0.0505* 
 (0.0313) (0.0183) (0.0264) (0.0416) (0.0237) 
PROFITi,t-1 -0.000487 0.00847* 0.00100 0.00150 -0.00384 
 (0.00569) (0.00413) (0.00608) (0.00652) (0.00354) 
ENV EXP t-1 -2.822+ -0.774 0.118 -21.18 -4.548 
 (1.589) (0.750) (1.813) (18.06) (3.023) 
Country*Years Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 1.923* 0.801* 0.111 11.68 2.710+ 
 (0.865) (0.392) (0.944) (9.399) (1.597) 
      
Observations 960 19260 15550 1695 22960 
Wald chi2 170,57 551,16 261,96 117,89 187,50 
Log likelihood -778.56761 -3034.7504 -1328.7994 -512.72605 -877.60243 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001 
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Table 11. Fixed Effects Negative Binomial, Sectors subsamples 
 (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 high tech medium tech low tech kibs other serv 
      
GREEN PATENTS t      
EMASi,t-1 0.237 0.114* 0.142* -0.250 -0.034 
 (0.281) (0.044) (0.056) (0.380) (0.175) 
PASTINNOi,t-1 0. 002*** 0.001** 0.003 0.003*** -0.004* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) 
EMPLOYEESi,t-1 0.005*** 0.005** 0.006* 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) 0.001 (0.000) 
PROFITi,t-1 -0.001 -0.013* -0.005 -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
ENV EXP t-1 1.955*** 0.235* 0.233 1.116*** 0.087*** 
 (0.520) (0.128) (0.142) (0.007) (0.002) 
Country*Years Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant -1.543*** 0.398 -1.268 -0.733*** -0.436*** 
 (0.258) (0.631) (0.699) (0.039) (0.120) 
      
Observations 960 19260 15550 1695 22960 
Wald chi2 548.05 85.12 110.77 439.17 37.36 
Log likelihood -7555.5581 -1558.5944 -1013.1033 -2989.9824 -359.53396 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001
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Table 12. Instrumental Variable Poisson estimates 
 First stage 
 
Second stage 
 
 
Second stage 
GREEN 
PATENTS 
 
    
EMPLOYEESi,t-1 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PROFITi,t-1 0.006** 0.016** 0.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
PASTINNOi,t-1 0.002*** 0.837*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) 0.066 (0.000) 
VERIFIERSt-1 0.401***   
 (0.002)   
EMASi,t-1  0.607*** 0.001*** 
  (0.050) (0.000) 
Years dummies Y Y Y 
Country dummies Y Y Y 
Constant 0.091*** 0.683*** -0.234*** 
 (0.003) (0.037) (0.001) 
R-squared                                                   0.4048 
LR chi2                                                                                                      1650.33 
 
Standard errors in parentheses + p < 0:10, * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:00
 
